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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) on international joint
ventures by American firms. The evidence suggests that the TRA had a significant effect on the
organizational form of U.S. business activity abroad. The TRA mandates the use of separate
“baskets” in calculating foreign tax credits on income received from foreign corporations owned
50% or less by Americans. This limitation on worldwide averaging greatly reduces the
attractiveness of joint ventures to kerican investors, particularly ventures in low-tax foreign
countries. Aggregate data indicate that U.S. participation in international joint ventures fell sharply
afier 1986. The decline in U.S. joint venture activity is most pronounced in low-tax countries, which
is consistent with the incentives created by the TR4. Moreover, joint ventures in low-tax countries
use more debt and pay greater royalties to their U.S. parents after 1986, which reflects their
incentives to economize on dividend payments.
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There is growing evidence of the importance of organizational form to businms
operations and of the influence of government policia on the forms that businessa take, Tm
systems often give firms incentives to adopt ce~in organizational forms at the expense of others,
For example, the U.S. corporate income tax must be paid by mrporations but not by unincorporated
busin=s~. This and other U.S. tax provisions appear to influence the orgmization of domatic
business,’ though their effect on international busin=s is still poorly understood.
me purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of 1986 U.S. tax legislation that
imposti significant rests on international joint venture operations. Since the 1986 law raisa the mst
of U,S. participation in joint ventures in some muntri= more than it doa in others, it is possible to
use the muntry-level pattern of rmpons~ after 1986 to infer the degr~ to which firms substitute one
organizational form for another, The r=ults indicate that presage of the TR4 C-oincida with a
dramatic shift in the level and pattern of U.S. participation in international joint ventures, sugg~ting
that the tax act may be responsible for significantly reduced American joint venmre activity. The
character of joint venture activity chang~ at the same time and in a way that is consistent with the
incentivm created by the legislation.
Until the 1980s, there were increasing numbers of international joint ventur~ between
American multinational firms and Iocally-owned foreign firms. Such arrangements offer American
firms the prospect of generating significant profits while obtaining market footholds and avoiding
some of the local market risks associatd with wholly-wned ventures. International joint ventures
are particularly popular in high-t~hnology industries in which different firms may have proprietary
assets - such as patents, trademarks, and know-how - that are complementary in production. Joint
venture activity is limited to a significant degree by the moral hazard rests inherent in organizational
‘See the evidence presented in Gordon and MacKie-Mmon (1990, 1994) and Gentry (1994).structura with split ownership. In spite of this limitation, joint venturw are widely viewti as the
cutting edge of international busin~s.2
The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TR4) introduced a number of important cha.ngw
intended to rationalize taxation in the United Statm and to reduce incentives for inefficient tax-
avoiding activiti=. One of the provisions of the TRA changed the taxation of dividends receivd
from international joint venturw ownd baween 10% and 50% by Americans. This reform increasa
the tax cost of undetiing joint ventur=, the effect being most pronounced for joint ventures in
Countri= with low W rata.
The joint venture provisions of the TRA had their origin in a much more sweping
proposal advanced by Pr~ident Reagan in 1985. In ~ Pmstieti’s tax reform pmpasds (1985), he
urged Congrtis to change the calculation of foreign tax credit limits by replacing the existing system,
based on worldwide averaga, with one that would calculate limits separate]y for each foreign
muntry. Such a change would reduce the foreign tax credits that American multinational firms could
claim, thereby incr~ing their U.S. tax Iiabilitie-s. By the time that Congr~s passed the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, this provision was removed due to its perceivd arbitrarinas and amid concern over its
potential impact on American competitiven=s abroad.
Congress decided to remove worldwide averaging ordy for categori= of foreign
income that it segregatw into sqarate “baskets.” The TR4 crest= a separate “basket” for dividends
rweived from each so-called m 10-50 corporation” - foreign arporations owned between 10% and
50% by Americans. By segregating inmme in this way, the W greatly reduces the attractiveness to
American inv~tors of minority participation in internationaljoint venturm, particularly those in low-
Tor example, Bleeke and Ernst (1993, p. 269) offer that, “Organizations of the future have to seek
partners who can share wsts and swap skills and accms to marke~. In the fluid global marketplace, it
is no longer possible or dmirable for a single organization to be entirely self-sufficient. Collaboration
is the value of the future. Alliancw are the structure of the future. ”
2tax foreign countri~. Since majority+wned venturm were not similarly affected by the TRA,
American multinationals with minority+wned joint ventura in low-tax countries face strong
the venturm or to r~uce or liquidate their
significmt effect on the organizational form
incentivw after 1986 either to become majority owners of “
minority positions.
The evidence suggmts that the TRA had a
of U.S. business activity abroad. Aggregate time series data reveal that American participation in
minority joint ventura declined significantly after 1986. The muntry-level pattern is consistent with
the incentivm created by the TRA: joint venture activity fell most sharply in muntrim with low tax
rat~. Fufiermore, the character of joint venture activity changed. By segregating dividends
received from “10-50 corporations” into separate “baskets,” the TR4 raisw the cost of equity
financing of joint ventur~, and thereby incrw~ the attractiveness of joint venture-sthat economize
on dividend payments to American partners. The evidence indicatfi that joint venturm in which
American firms participate after 1986 exhibit higher debt/asset ratios and greater proclivity to pay
royaltia to American partners than before 1986, the difference being significant y more pronouncd
in low-tax muntri= than in high-tax muntriu. Assuming that royalty payments repr~ent
wmpensation for transfers of technology, the “basket” provisions of the TRA appear to influence the
pattern of twhnology transfer by U.S. multinationals.
The joint venture provisions of the TRA have greater impact on operations in low-tax
foreign countri~ than those in high-tax foreign muntriw, which makes it possible to identify the
impact of the 1986 Act by relating chang~ in busin~s activity afier 1986 to local tax rates.
Unfortunately, this procdure do= not clearly distinguish different ways in which American firms
respond to the TRA. Possible r~ponses include mnverting joint ventures to majority~wned
afflliat~, relocating joint ventures to high-tax muntri=, changing the capital structures and payout
polici~ of existing joint ventures, and avoiding altogether some otherwise-attractive joint venture
3opportunities. The available evidence does not distinguish between three responses but does
document the sensitivity of organizational form to tu considerations. The evident responsiveness of
international joint venture activity to the 1986 tax change is consistent witi a growing body of
literature that documents the effect of tax policim on the location and behavior of multinational
firms.’
Section 2 of the paper reviews the determina.nt.sof international joint venture activity,
presents estimata of the factors that influence the location of American joint ventures in 1982, and
trac= the decline of U,S, international joint ventures after 1986. Section 3 analyzes the effect of the
TR.Aon the incentives for American firms to form international joint ventures. Section 4 pr~ents
regression results describing the effect of local tax ratm on American participation in joint venturw
before and after the 1986 tax change. Sution 5 is the wnclusion.
2. International Joint Venture Activity.
In undertaking joint ventur~, firms wncede mntrol over operating and financial
d~isions in return for opportunity= to benefit from other firms’ intangible and other assets. There
are many busin~s situations in which the moral hazard, monitoring, and other costs associated with
joint ventures so reduce their valu~ to potential participan~ that they outweigh the benefits of
wllaboration. International joint ventur= are probably even more wstl y than their domestic
wunterpw, since information is less readily obtained at great distance, monitoring is more
expensive, and the ability to wrdinate operations and finances to minimize taxw is of particular
value to owners of foreign inv=trnents. At the same time, international joint ventures may provide
opportunitiw to explore markets and share risks and complementary technologi~ at relatively low cost.
‘See, for example, Bond (1981), Slemrod (1990), Grubett and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994),
and Hina (forthwming). This literature is summarized recently by Hines (1996).
4Joint ventures have been extensively analyzed, The moral hazard problems that arise
in cooperative efforts have attracted considerable attention since Holmstrom’s (1982) finding that
efficient sharing rulw do not exist for certain typw of partnerships. Subsequent work identifies
circumstance= in which efficient sharing rules tnuy exist, including those with repeated play, unlimited
liability, and those in which risk-averse agents use stochastic sharing rules.’ In the absence of
wmplde mntracts, joint ownership is generally suboptimal due to the sharing of r~idual control
rights.s In the important case in which assets are jointly used, however, joint ownership may be an
efficient arrangement. Aghion and Tirole (1994) find that “split” property rights can encourage
imovation in settings with incomplete information. Similarly, the existence of potential spillovers
means that parent firms may benefit from mrd inatd R&D activity in spite of the associated moral
h=ard problems .* The moral hazard created by pmnership arrangements can facilitate certain
of market transactions. Crampton et al. (1987) note that, in environments with inmmplete
information, joint ownership of an asset may be consistent with efficient r=ource allocation.
me theory of joint ventures carries implications for the
busin=s operations. Horstmann and Markusen (1995) suggat that two
structure of multinational
characteristics of economim,
technological sophistication and growth of local markets, may influence the organizational form of
efforts to explore new markets. They predict that f~ter market growth increasa the benefits
associated with information acquisition through joint venturm while greater technological
sophistication reduces the likelihood of appropriation by a majority foreign p-er. In mntrast,
Svejnar and Smith (1984) suggmt that contracts between ptiners may make organizational forms
‘See, for example, Legros and
5See,for example, Alchian and
and Hart (1995).
Matthews (1993).
Demsetz (1972), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
%= Bhattacharya a al. (1992), Karnien w al. (1992), and Gandal and Schotchmer (1993) for
exampl=.
5relatively unimportant from the standpoint of control. They note that joint venture partners can avoid
moral hazard problems through prior agr~men~, and can arrange to receive profit shares in
nondividend forms that nd not be allocated in propofiion to ownership shar~.
Empirical studi~ identify thr~ primary motivations for joint venture formation. The
first is I-ing on the part of resource-constrained firms. Kogut (1991) characterize joint ventures
as “real options” that provide firms with information they can use in forming subsequent plm - that
may include acquiring their ptiners or dissolving their joint ventur~. Similarly, Balakrishnan and
Koza (1993) view joint ventures as intermediate forms btiw~n markets and hierarchic that permit
firms to overcome informational mymmetri~ at low cost. The sand motivation is to placate host
governments, Franko (1989), Gomes-Caser= (1990), and Contractor (1990) argue that sole
ownership is generally preferred but occasional y concdd in bargains with host governments. The
third, and most often cited, motivation is to anomize on transaction rest s.’ As outlined by
Beamish and Bardc.s(1987), Contractor and Lorange (1988) and Gomes-Cmser= (1989), joint
ventur~ balance the benefits of combining complementary assets with costs that include ma.nagerid
mnflicts and shirking. HeMart (1991) arguu that the mst of using market transactions to purchase
other firms’ intermediate inputs mak~ joint ventures particularly attractive.
Suweys wmmord y repoti increasing use of joint venturm by multinational firms.
Anderson (1990) and Geringer and Hebert (1991) claim that American firms rely to an ever-greater
extent on international joint ventur=, and will mntinue to do so. Curhan, Davidson, and Suri (1977)
document a dramatic rise in the use of international joint ventures by Americm firms betw~n 1951
and 1975 using survey data collwted through the Harvard Multinational Projwt. Hladik (1985)
extends Curhan ti al.’s data through 1984 and projwts continual growth of international joint
ventur= by U.S. firms.
me-se theoriw are reviewed in Caves (1996).The available aggregate evidence on U.S. joint venture activity is reported by the
Bureau of Emnomic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce (BEA), which performs periodic
benchmark surveys of the foreign operations of Americm multinational corporations. me two most
recent surveys cover 1982 and 1989. BEA (1985, 1992) reports data on country and industry baa
including details on income statements, balance sheets, employment patterns, and parent-affiliate
transactions such as royalty and interest payments. In addition, BEA (1985) tabulatm r~ponsw to its
1982 survey of governrnent-imposed ownership r=trictions. 0
BEA reports aggregate figur= for countriw in which there is substantial U.S.
invwtment; to protect the confidentiality of survey respondents, BEA suppressm information for
countries in which one or two U.S. firms represent large fractions of total U.S. investment.9 The
BEA data distinguish activities of majority~wned foreign afflliates of U.S. firms from activiti~ of all
affiliates owned at least 10% by U.S. firms. Different= betwwn these two categorizations repr=ent
the activities of afflliates owned between 10% and 50% by U.S. firms. Throughout this paper we
refer to such minority~wned afflliat~ as joint ventures. 10
%e 1982 BEA survey asks firms to indicate whether host governments limit the proportion of equity
American parents can hold in their affiliates. BEA repo~ the fraction of respondents in each country
indicating that they face such restrictions. This fraction can then be used as an index of the severity of
local rmtrictions on foreign ownership sharw, as in Contractor (1990).
%ese data suppressionslimit the available sample size for the statistical work prmented in Tabl= 1-2
and 4-7. Countiiw in which joint venture activity falls to ordy one or two firms by 1989 are excludd
from the sample, which reduces the chance of finding an effwt of the U.S. tax change on joint venture
activity. In addition, we follow Hinw and Rice (1994) in excluding from our sample the major oil
ex~rting muntries in order not to mnfound the analysis with the special tax and regulatory issues that
affect the oil industry. Adding data on oil exporting countri= to the sample analyzed in the regrmsions
reported in Tables 5-7 chang~ the results very little.
‘“American joint venture activity is ancentrated in afflliates owned between 10% and 50% by
American firms. Data reported by Mattaloni (1995) indicate that over 90% of the majority+wned foreign
afflliat= of U.S. firms are 100% owned.
7The tax treatment of multinational firms is discussed in detail in section 3,
Since U.S. firms pay wrporate W= to foreign host muntries but on occasion receive spwid
treatment in the form of tax holidays and other local tax mnc=sions, it is necmsary to calculate tax
rat= specifically applicable to American investors. Hinu and Rice (1994) report such tax rata for
1982, and Appendix Table 2 lists comparable tax rates for 1989.11 In the statistical work, thwe tax
rates are then truncated at 34% in order to reflwt the tax costs of joint venture ownership by U.S.
investors with excws foreign tu credits after 1986. National R&D intensititi are repotied in
National Science Foundation (1991); since relative magnitudw are very stable over time, 12ordy the
1988 cross-section is used. The Summers-Htiton (1991) data base includa figures for real GDP;
Mankiw et al. (1992) report long-term economic growth rata based on th~e data.
Joint venture intens@ in 1982
Macroanomic wnditions appear to influence the formation of joint ventures. Table
1 pre-sentsinformation on U.S. joint venture intemity in different muntri~ in 1982. Joint venture
intensity is the ratio of equity in minority-controlled U.S. foreign affiliates to equity in all U.S.
foreign afflliat~. 13 Mean joint venture intensity among rapid GDP growth, high R&D intensity
muntries is 31.8%, which compares to 17,1% among slow growth, high R&D intensity countriti.
Similarly, the mean joint venture intensity among high growth, low R&D intensity countri= is
llFollowing Hina and Rice (1994), the tax rata listed in Appendix Table 2 equal the smaller of the
statutory wrporate tax rate for 1989 repotied in Price Waterhouse (1989) and the average tax rate paid
by American firms in 1989. The average tax rate is calculated as the ratio of income taxes paid by local
afflliatw of American firms to their local pre-tax income.
12SeeHinm (1995, pp. 235-236).
‘mere are other available muures ofjoint venture intensity, including those based on salm, assets,
and property, plant and equipment. All yield similar r=ult.s. Tabl= in the paper report results for equity
intensiti~, since they are are less susceptible than other measures to data problems associated with the
financing subsidiari~ of nonfinancial mrporations,
828.0%, which compares to 4.4% among low-growth, low R&D intensity countriw. Joint ventures
are concentrated in rapidly-growing and tuhnologicall y advancd countries.
Table 2 presents results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is joint
venture intensity in 1982. In the regrmsions reported in mlurnns 1 and 2 the =timated effects of
nationaJ GDP growth and R&D intensity are positive but not significant. The interaction of GDP
growth and R&D intensity is positive and significant in the regression repofid in mlumn 3, while the
estimated separate eff~~ of GDP growth, R&D intensity, and GDP level are insignificant, The
regrmsions reported in miumn.s 4 and 5 indicate that the 1982 tax rate has a positive and significant
effut on joint venture intensity in 1982, as do ownership r~trictions imposti on foreign investors.
The regrwsion reported in column 5 implies that 10% greater ownership restrictions raise joint
venture intensity by 11%; that 10% higher tax= raise joint venture intensity by 5.3%; and that a
doubling of the mm interaction of GDP growth and R&D intensity (from 0.05 to O.1) would raise
joint venture intensity by 21%.
~ese r~ults are mnsistent with thariw of joint venture formation that emphasize the
importance of market growth and twhnological sophisticalion, Ownership r~trictions imposed by
govemmen~ also have impofiant effuts. It is noteworthy that the patterns reported in Table 1 persist
in subsarnpla distinguished by ownership restrictions. 14
Joint vetium intemities, 1982-1993
While the Benchmark surveys offer the most comprehensive information on the
activiti= of U.S. multinationals, BEA provid= more periodic data in annual supplements published
“Spwifically, the pattern ofjoint venture intensity in the subsample of wuntries with few ownership
restrictions in 1982 closely r~embles that appearing in Table 1.
9since 1982 in the Survey of Current Busintis.’5 Figure 1 US= thae data to trace the joint venture
intensities of U.S. afflliat~ in all foreign muntriti from 1982 through 1993, distinguishing afiliates
in all industri~ from those in manufacturing. ‘d The time seria is relatively stable betwwn 1982
and 1986, but features a significant break in 1987 or 1988. Joint ventures constitute 22.8% of the
assets of U.S.-owned foreign affiliata in 1982, but only 18.8% by 1989, which repraents an 18%
dwline. Joint ventures constitute only 15.1% of the assets of U.S.-wned foreign affiliat~ in 1993.
Numbers of U.S.-owned international joint venturti, and numbers of U.S. parent
firms with international joint ventur=, show similar declina over the 1980s. Thtie numbers are
available ordy in the Benchmark Surveys; Table 3 pre,sen~ survey results for 1982 and 1989. The top
panel of Table 3 indicat= that the number of international joint venturw by U.S. firms fell by 12.3%
betwwn 1982 and 1989, while the number of majority~wned venturm rose by 7.3%. The bottom
panel of Table 3 repom that the number of U.S. parent firms with international joint ventures fell by
11.4% between 1982 and 1989, while the number of U.S. parenw with majority-wned affiliat~ rose
by 6.9%. The information praented in Figure 1 and Table 3 is consistent with the hy-poth=is that
chang= occurring around 1986 are r~ponsible for a significant reduction in international joint
venture activity by American firms.
3. The 1986 Tax Change.
In order to identify the impact of the 1986 TR4 on U.S. joint ventures in foreign
countries, it is helpful first to review the general features of U.S. taxation of foreign-source profits,
‘5Mataloni(1995) is an example.
‘me figures prwented in Figure 1 are ratios of joint venture assets to assets of all U.S. affiliata.
Assets are used bwause BEA does not report equity figur= on an annual basis. Alternative joint venture
intensity measur~ calculated on the basis of employment or sales show patterns that are similar to that
for assets depicted in Figure 1,
10sand to wnsider the legislative history of TRA provisions that affect joint venturu, and third to
analyze the incentiv= created by the Act.
U.S. Wation offoreign-source profls’7
The United States taxes inwme on a “re-sidence”basis, meaning that American
wrporations and individuals owe taxes to the U.S. government on all of their worldwide income,
whether earned inside the United States or outside the United States. me top U.S. corporate tax rate
was 34 percent in 1989 and is now 35 percent. Since foreign profits are usually taxed in host
countri~, U.S. law provides a foreign tax credit for income taxw (and relatd taxes) paid to foreign
governments, thereby avoiding double taxation of American multinationals, Under U.S. law, an
American corporation earning $100 in a foreign country with a 10% tax rate (and a foreign tax
obligation of $10) pays ordy $25 to the U.S, government, since iw U.S. corporate tax liability of $35
(35% of $100) is reduced to $25 by the foreign tax credit of $10. The foreign tax credit is, however,
limited to U.S. tax liability on foreign inwme; if, in the example, the foreign tax rate were 50
percent, then the firm pays $50 to the foreign government but its U,S. foreign tax credit is limited to
$35. Hence, an American firm rweiv= full credits for its foreign tax= paid only when it is in a
“deficit credit” position, i.e., when its average foreign tax rate is Ias than its ~ rate on dom~tic
operations. A firm has “excms credits” if its available foreign tax credits excd U.S. tax tax liability
on its foreign inmme. ‘E
Deferral of U.S. taxation of cemin foreign earnings is another important feature of
the U.S. international W system. An American firm is taxed on a subsidiary’s foreign income only
‘Tofiions of this brief d=cription of U.S. tax law are excerpted from Hines (1991).
lqn order to receive foreign tax credits for foreign tax= paid by afflliat=, U.S. firms must have at
least 10% ownership sharm. A further re-strictionis that only those taxes that qualify as income ta.xa
are creditable.
11when repatriated to the parent mrporation; this type of deferral is available only to foreign afil iat~
that are separately incorporated as subsidiaria in foreign countriti, The ability to defer home-
country mes may create incentiv~ to delay repatriating dividends from foreign subsidiari~.’9 This
incentive arise-sin those cm~ in which firms expect never to repatriate their foreign earnings, or
those in which they anticipate that future years will be more attractive for repatriation (either because
dom~tic tax rates will be lower or b~ause future sourcw of foreign income will generate excess
foreign tax credits that can be used to offset U.S. tax liability on the dividends).
Firms are required to construct averag~ of their taxable incomm and taxes paid in all
foreign operations when calculating foreign tax credits and foreign tax credit limits. This system of
worldwide averaging was put in place in 1976. As a consequence of worldwide averaging, American
investors in low-tax locations such as Hong Kong can avoid U.S. tax otherwise due upon repatriation
of dividends if the firm has sufficient inmme from high-tax foreign locations such as Germany with
which the Hong Kong income and tax= can be averaged.
credits
U.S. law limits worldwide averaging by requiring firms to calculate foreign tax
separately for different sources of inwme, known as “baskets.” An example is income from
petroleum extraction, which is usually very heavily taxed by host countria, and with which Congr~s
is unwilling to let firms average their other foreign income in calculating foreign tax credits.
Consequently, petroeum income has its own “basket” and it is therefore possible for some compani=
to have excess foreign tax credits in the “petroleum basket” while having deficit foreign tax credits in
the “active basket” (consisting of active foreign-source inwme).
‘me incentive to delay repatriation of Iightly taxed foreign earnings is greatly reduced by the Subpart
F rul~ enacted by Congr=s in 1962. Th=e rula apply to controlled foreign corporations, which are
foreign wrporations owned at least 50% by American firms or individuals holding stakes of at least 10%
each. Under Subpart F, a subsidiary’s passive inwme, and any income invested in U.S. prope~, are
treated as if distributed to its American owners, thereby subjecting that income to immediate U.S.
taxation. Controlld foreign corporations that reinvest their foreign earnings in active business= can
continue to defer their U.S. tax liability on those earnings.
12% Tax Refotm Ad of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 greatly increased the number of “bmkets” used by
Americm firms to calculate foreign tax credit limits. In particular, the TRA segregat~ income from
joint ventures owned 50% or Itis by Americm into distinct “baskeu” - separate “baske~” for each
venture - thereby preventing worldwide averaging of foreign tax credits.= While it is possible to
avoid the separate “basket” treatment of joint ventur=, the steps that must be taken to do so are
sufficiently mstly that they are used ordy on occasion.zl
The history of the TRA offers some clu~ to Congress’s thought process in enacting
such a change. Prwident Reagan (1985, pp. 385-396) originally proposed that the United Stat~
eliminate altogether the use of worldwide averaging in calculating foreign tax credit limits, arguing
that worldwide averaging can give U.S. firms excwsive incentivm to invest in low-tax foreign
wuntri~ and also encourag~ some high-tax foreign countrim to maintain their high tax rates.
Congras was unwilling to adopt the Pr~ident’s plan, feeling that, for a given total income accruing
to a multinational firm, the distribution of that income between afflliatm located in different foreign
~Other “baske~” introduced by the TRA include those for passive income, high withholding tax
inter~t, financial servic~ income, and shipping income.
2’Tillinghast (1990), Craw-fordand Hoke (1995), and Skaletsky and Shackelford (1996) discuss some
of the methods used to avoid separate “basket” treatment of inmme from joint ventures, Th~e methods
involve either diluting the foreign partner’s ownership through the purchase of stock or additional options
in the joint venture, or else reorgmizing the ownership of the joint venture by setting up a sep~ate entity
to own the U.S. share in the foreign joint venture. The first alternative is mstly from the standpoint of
relations with foreign partners, while the smnd triggers additional U.S. taxm through Subp~ F, leading
Tillinghut (1990, p. 224) to conclude that “in many case-s... these techniquw do not work. ” A third
alternative is to establish a foreign joint venture as a partnership rather than a separate mrporation. Such
an arrangement entails various legal and businas asts and prevents American owners from deferring
U.S, taxation of foreign income. There exist hybrid structures that are pmnerships from the standpoint
of U.S. law and wrporations from tie standpoint of foreign law, from which income is not subjwt to
separate “basket” treatment. But deferral of U.S. taxation is not permitted with such structures, and U.S.
regulations are such that McClellan, Rieu and Cordon (1996, p. 2) find that “Achieving hybrid treatment
using th~e rulw is often complex, expensive, arrdtime consuming and can rwult in a structure that is
commercially limited. ”
13muntri~ hw little anomie significance. Since country-by-country foreign w credit Iimits also
impose grmter administrative burdens on firms and tax authoriti~, Congr~s preferred to continue
treating the foreign activitia of U.S. multinational firms as integratd units for U.S. tax purposti,
Congrus wm relucwt, however, to apply the same logic to joint venturm in which
Americans hold ownership stakes of 50% or less, believing that such entitiw have insufficient
“identity of inter~t with U.S. shareholders to trtit nonrnajority ownership positions as units of a
worldwide busina. ”= In addition, Congr=s was mious to deter the use of minority American
ownership as a tax avoidance strategy in low-tax country=. = Consequently, the TRA remov~
worldwide averaging of foreign tax credits for such ventura. Since the TRA retains worldwide
averaging of foreign tax credits for majority~wned U.S. afflliata, the tax change strongly encouragw
substitution of one organizational form for another.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 introduced other impo-t changw, notably reducing
the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate from 46% to 34%. This rate reduction increased tie number of
U.S. multinationals with exce5s foreign tax credits,x The data presentd below sugg~t that the
%ongrwsional sentiment is described in U.S. Congrms (1987, pp. 867-868). Congr=s’s reasoning
has bwn qu~tioned by Tillinghast (1990), who arguw that, since U.S. law d=ms 10% ownership to be
sufficient for firms to claim foreign tax credits, it should also suffice to treat an affiliate as part of a
worldwide group.
‘Since minority joint ventures are not Controlled Foreign Corporations, they are not subject to the
Subpart F rules, and American owners can defer U.S. taxation of their unrepatriated pasive foreign
income. One function of the joint venture provisions of the TRA was to prevent the expanded use of tax
haven invwtment funds with minority U.S. ownership and low payout rata. Crawford and Hoke (1995,
p. 1767) note that the TRA was successful in this regard, since the post-1986 separate basket treatment
of joint ventures is typically more wstly than loss of deferral occasioned by the Subpti F rules.
%rubert, Randolph and Rousslang (19%) report that firms with excess foreign tax credits received
33% of the foreign income of U.S. corporations in 1984, and 66% in 1990. They note that even this
66% figure is smaller than the 79% predicted right after presage of the TRA, and conjecture that
contemporanaus foreign m law changes along with endogenous behavior of American mmpanies may
acaunt for the difference. They also note that the fraction of income received by firms with excess
foreign tax credits appears to be falling over time, reaching 35% in 1992.
14mnfluence of thwe changes discourage the use of joint ventur~ in low tax countri~ u such
investment bwame considerably more costly.
Inceti”ves created by the TR.A
Itis helpful to specify an American multinational’s valuation of its foreign afflliates in
order to distinguish some of the possible reactions to tax changes. We mnsider operations with
locally decreasing returns to scale production functions, but for simplicity, analyze the valuation of an
affiliate with fixd total capitalization (normal“wedto equal unity). We analyze three characteristics:
(i) the fraction of debt in the capital structure, denoted b; (ii) the U.S. share of quity ownership,
denotd s (with O < s <0.5 for joint ventures); and (iii) the extent of technology transfer from the
American parent firm to the joint venture, denoted T. Naturally, tie foreign afftliate mak~
numerous other decisions that influence its profitability, but these ue suppressed in order to focus on
the three variablm of intermt. The American parent firm is assumed to have exc~s foreign tax
credits after 1986.
Denote by Qi(s, 6, T) the one-period output generated by a unit invatrnent in a joint
venture located in country i. Not all of this output is available for distribution to the owners of the
afflliate, however, since royalti=, inter=t, and tax= must be paid first. Let P(T) denote the royalty
that is paid to the Americm invmtor as mmpensation for providing T units of technology to the
afftliate. The one-period market interest rate is given by r, so the one-period cost of debt is r~. The
affiliate’s before-tax income is: [Qi(s, b, T) - P(T) - rb], and its income after foreign taxes is:
(1) [Qi(s, 6,T) - P(T) - r6](l -r*),
We wnsider steady stat~ in which afflliata pay dividends equal to after-tax profits,
15thereby maintaining their debt/equity ratios at 6 and their capitalizations at unity. An Americu
partner receivm the following value (V) from its participation in the joint venture:
(2) v= s[Qi(s, 6, T) - pm - r8](l-7*)(1-+u~) + P(T) - Ci(S, T) - As(l+),
in which fu~ represents the effective U.S. tax rate on dividends received from joint ventures in
country i, and Ci(s,T) is the spillover ast associated with transferring technology T to a joint venture
located in muntry i in which the U.S. parent owns shares. The last term, M(l+), reflects the cost
of investing equity capital in the joint venture; Ais the one-period cost of equity funds, while s(l+) is
the investment necasary to obtain a share s of the affiliate’s equity.
American firms cannot generally select s, 6, and T to maximize the value of their
p~icipation in joint ventur=, since foreign partners typically have differing objectivw or opinions
about the appropriate division of ownership shara, debt/equity ratios, and use of proprietary
American technology. Furthermore, some host governments restrict foreign ownership of local
enterprises.
It is useful to ansider the effut of changm in fu~ on the value of U.S. participation
in joint ventures. Higher rates of fu~ reduce after-tax returns available to American investors,
thereby reducing the attractiven~s of joint venture activity. As a wnsequence, Americans are likely
to reduce the number of joint venturw in which they participate. The cost of a higher rate of +u~is
not the same for all affiliates, since affdiates with higher debt ratios or greater royalty payments
=Cape some of the effti of higher U.S. taxation.U One expects, therefore, that in low-tax
muntri~ in which dividends r~eived from joint ventures bmme more expensive after 1986,
American firms will participate in fewer joint ventures. The joint ventures in which they do
‘It is easily verified that dW/a+U~aP > 0, as is aW/a~u~a6.
16participate after 1986 should be heavily leveraged, and if possible structured to compensate Americm
investors with royaltia instead of dividends .rn Alternatively, if firms choose organizational form
entire]y on mmmercial or strategic grounds and without regard to tax COSM, there should be no tax-
related changes in the relative joint venture intensitim of U,S. operations in low tax and high tax
muntri= after 1986. Consequently, post-1986 patterns of joint venture activity permit measurement
of the elasticity of organizational form to tax rests.
4. Responses to the 1986 tax change.
me changa introduced
particularly those in low-tax countries.
by the 1986 TRA raise the tax costs of joint venturw,
The impact of the TRA is a function of capital structure and
propensity to pay royaltiti to Americm owners. This section invatigates whether the pattern of joint
venture activity after 1986 is consistent with substitution in r~ponse to these incentiv~.
Changes in investment p~erns
The data dwcribed in the top panel of Table 4 indicate that U.S. joint venture activity
in low tax C.ountriwgrew more slowly betw~n 1982 and 1989 than did majority owned U.S. busine-ss
activity, while the reverse is true in high tax muntrim. Equity in U.S.-ownd joint venturw in low
tax muntri~ had mean growth of 53.8%, while equity in majority owned U.S. afflliatm in the same
countri= grew by 129,2%. American joint ventur~ in high-tax countria between 1982 and 1989
grew by 220.2%, while the arresponding figure for U.S. majority owned affiliat= is 53.2%. Three
‘Not all of these implications are guarantd by the comparative statics derived from (2). For
example, it ispossible that d2ci(s,T)/~s~T c O(as noted by Nakamura and Yeung, 1994), since foreign
partners with ‘greater ownership shares may be in good ‘~sitions to obtain proprietary tmhnolog~m
transferred to joint ventur=m If this is an
significantly reduce s may thereby reduce T
dividends.
important consideration, then higher values of +u~ that
and P in spite of the incentive to substitute royalties for
17growth rat= sugg~t that whatever is responsible for the relative stagnancy of U.S, joint venture
activity in low-tax countries did not affut joint venturu in high-tax countria. The pattern evident in
Table 4 persists in subsarnpla distinguished by equity r~trictions: U.S. joint ventures grew relatively
more slowly in low tax countri~ with few ownership r~trictions than they did in high tax countria
with few ownership ratrictions.
Table 5 presents OLS =timat~ of the impact of foreign tax ratw on growth ratfi of
equity in U.S. joint ventur= and majority~wned U.S. afflliata between 1982 and 1989. Columns 1
and 2 present regression results for growth rates of joint ventures. The estimated effect of taxation is
positive and significant in the regr=sion reported in column 1, indicating that 1% lower foreign tax
rates are associatd with 6.9% slower growth of joint venturm over the seven years betwwn 1982 and
1989. Since the mean tax rate in the sample is 25.0% and the mean growth rate of joint ventures is
140.8%, this ~rr~ponds to a -1.23 elasticity of joint venture growth with respect to tax costs. The
regression in wlumn 2 adds as an explanatory variable ownership r~trictions in 1982, thereby
capturing the effect of gradual ownership Iiberalizations during the 1980s.n The estimated tax
wefflcient remains positive and significant, and is somewhat larger than that repofied in column 1,
while the effect of ownership r~trictions is negative (as expected) and insignificant.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report coefficient ~timata from regrasions with the
growth of majority~wned U.S. affiliates as the dependent variable. The estimated tax effect is
negative and insignificant in both regressions, as is the effwt of ownership restrictions in the
%e reason to include ownership restrictions as an explanatory variable is to avoid omitted v~iable
bias that ~uld arise if tax rat= are correlated with changes in ownership restrictions during the sample
period. Unfortunately, BEA did not ask U.S. firms about local ownership r=trictiom in its 1989survey,
so it is not possible to construct a variable equal to the difference betw~n the fraction of U.S. firms
required to limit their ownership of local affiliatm in 1989 and the same fraction in 1982. Since
ownership r=trictions were genera.11 y liberalbed in Ihe 1980s, the 1982 fraction is a proxy for cha.ngm
over the decade. An alternative mtiod of controlling for changa in ownership rwtrictions is to Iimit
the sample to countria with very few r=trictions in 1982. The regressions reported in Tabl~ 5-7 were
re-run on this subsample, with results that are similar to those obtaind with the larger sample.
18regr~sion reported in wlumn 4, Th~e results suggest that the positive effect of taxrat= on joint
venture growth does not reflect omitted variabla that influence businws activity generally, since tie
same effat do= not appear in estimatw of growth of majority owned affiliatm. The regressions
repotid in columns 5 and 6 make such a wmparison more explicit: the dependent variable in th~e
regressions is the difference between joint venture growth and the growth of majority owned
afflliat=. The results indicate that foreign tax rates have positive and significant effwts on this
difference. The point ~timate of the tax coefficient reported in column 6 indicata that 1% lower
foreign tax rates are associated with 10.7% slower growth of joint ventures, relative to majority
owned afflliat~, betw~n 1982 and 1989, Alternative spuifications of these regressions produce
similar results.rn
The tax rate variable used in the regrmsions reported in Table 5 is potentially
endogenous to changm in the form of U.S. inv=tment, as it is based on average tax rates that may
differ betw~n joint ventures and majority owned afflliates. In order to explore the sensitivity of the
results to this wnsideration, the regressions reportd in Tabl~ 5-7 were re-run using 1982 tax rates in
place of 1989 tax rata. The results, which are reported in Appendix Tablm 3-5, differ little from
those obtained using 1989 tax rates.n
=egr~sions in which the dependent variable is redefinti as the fraction of assets or prope~ plant
and equipment (instead of equity) held by U.S. joint ventures produce r=ults that are similar to those
reported in Table 5. Since not all U.S. multinational firms have excess foreign tax credik in 1989, it
is useful to wnsider an alternative specification of the tax rate variable that capturm the ast of separate
“basket” treatment ofjoint ventures in high tax muntrim owned by parents with deficit foreign tax credits
that are thereby unable to cross-credit tax payments made by their joint ventures. The alternative
definition of the tax variable is the u.bsolufevulue of the difference betwmn 0.34 and the local tax rate.
Regressions using this tax variable produce results that are consistent with those repotied in Tabl= 5-7.
‘Alternative IV specifications in which 1982tax rat= are used u instruments for 1989tax rates also
generate results that are similar to those reported in Tablea 5-7.
19Changes in royalty payrnenfpaUerns
The middle panel of Table 4 de-scriba chang= in royalties between 1982 and 1989
for joint ventures and majority owned afflliatm. Roya.ltim are defined as the ratio of royaltim paid to
U.S. parents to total affiliate equity. Mean royalty paymenu by U.S.-owned joint ventures in low tm
muntria declined by 0.03%, while royalty paymen~ by joint ventur~ in high tax countri~ declined
by 0.31%, The opposite pattern appears in royalty payments by majority owned U.S. afflliate,s: mean
royalti~ rose by 0.35% in low tax Countria and by 1.12% in high tax C.ountri&. Thtie differences
are consistent with U.S. owners’ incentivw to transfer twhnology rather than capital after 1986 to
their joint ventures in wuntri= with low tax rat=, thereby substituting royaltim for dividends.
Table 6 prwents estimates of the impact of foreign tu rat= on changes betw~n 1982
and 1989 in ratios of royalty payments to affiliate equity.m Columns 1 and 2 pr~ent regrasion
results for royalty payments by joint ventures, in which foreign tax rat~ have negative and significant
effects on royalti=. Foreign tax ratw have positive and significant effwts on royalty payments by
majority owned afflliates in the regressions reported in mlumns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in
the regressions reported in columns 5 and 6 is the difference betw~n the change in royalti~ paid to
U.S. owners by joint ventures and the change in royaltia paid by majority owned afflliat~. The
resul& indicate that foreign tax rates significant!y influence this difference. The point wtimate of the
tax wefflcient reportd in column 6 indicat= that 1% lower foreign tax rates are associated with
0.052% higher royalty payments by joint ventures than by majority ownd affiliatm. Since
government regulations require royalty payments to mrr~pond to technology transfers, thwe results
imply that U.S. firms r~pond to higher tax costs of dividends by investing technology rather than
‘Similar resul~ appear when the d~endent variable is redefined as the ratio of royalty paymenti to
affiliate assets. RMults are also similar when royalty paymen~ in brh 1982 and 1989 are normalized
by 1982 equity.
20capital in their afflliata.”
Chunges in ~ital structure
In raising the tax cost of dividends received from joint ventur~ in low tax countries,
the 1986 TRA enmuragm affiliates to substitute borrowing for equity. While a number of studies
investigate the influence of the TRA on borrowing patterns,’z there is little examination of ifi impact
on affiliatw of different organizational types. The bottom panel of Table 4 describ~ changw in
leverage ratios betw~n 1982 and 1989 for joint ventur= and majority owned affiliates. Leverage
ratios are ratios of debt to total assew.33 The mean leverage ratios of U.S.-own4 joint ventur~ in
low tax countries rose by 7.4% betw=n 1982 and 1989, while leverage ratios of joint venturw in low
m muntri= fell by 3.0%. Leverage ratios of majority owned U.S. afflliat~ show the opposite
pattern with far Iws variability: the mean leverage ratio in low tax countrim fell by 2.2%, while
leverage ratios in high tax countri= fell by 1.1%. This pattern is consistent with incentivw
introduced in 1986 to economize on dividend payments from joint venturm in countrifi with low tax
rates.
Table 7 pr~ents ~timates of the effect of foreign tax rates on chang~ in leverage
ratios betw~n 1982 and 1989. Column 1 presents regrasion resul~ for leverage ratios of joint
ventures, in which foreign tax rates have negative but insignificant effwts on leverage. The results
“Another possibility is that firms substitute royalty payments for dividends in rwponse to the tax
incentiva without changing the amount of transferred technology, Kopits (1976), Hines (1995) and
Grubert (1995) =timate the responsiven=s of royalty payments to tax incentiv=. Since tahnology
transfers are unobsemable, it is not possible to distinguish mmpletely technology substitution from adept
acmunting with the available data.
‘See Collins and Shackelford (1992), AIKhuler and Mintz (1995), and Froot and Hines (1995).
me numerator of the leverage ratio is long-term debt plus current liabilities other than trade
accounts and payabl~,
21repofied in column 2 indicate that foreign tax rates have positive and insignificant effects on the
leverage ratios of majority owned affiliatw. The dependent variable in tie regr~sion reported in
column 3 is the difference betwen the chang~ in the leverage ratios of joint ventur~ and majority
owned afflliata. The rwults indicate that foreign tax rata have a negative and significant effect on
this difference, the point estimate implying that 1% lower foreign tax rates are associated with 0.81%
higher ratios of debt to assets in joint ventura than in majority owned affiliat~.
The ability of U.S. ptiners to effect such changfi in capital structure and technology
transfer without antrol is notable. mile the capital structure changes documented in Table 7 might
have b-n determined by the foreign majority owners without input from U.S. pwners, the difference
in leverage ratio cha.ng= betw~n joint venture affiliatw in low and high tax countri~ raises the
possibility that U.S, partners exert mntrol over capital structure choic~ in joint venture affdiat~.
5. Conclusion.
The evidence indicates that U.S. multinationals significantly altered their joint venture
activity in rmponse to the incentives crated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This r=ponse appears
in patterns of investment, capital structure, and technology transfer as reflectd by royalty payments.
This behavior is consistent both with withdrawal from overseas joint ventur= and with substitution of
majority (or 100%) ownership for joint venture participation. While it is difficult to distinguish three
reactions on the basis of available data, it is clear that Congr&s’s effort to create separate “baskets”
for foreign joint ventur= succded in significmtly reducing American joint venture activity after
1986.
Previous thmretical and empirical work emphasiz~ the role of joint ventur~ in
exploring new markets and in high twhnology industries. To the extent that joint venturm provide
unique opportunity=, the separate “basket” provisions of the TRA significantly weaken the
22mmptiitive positions of U.S. firms in foreign markets. Such an outcome certainly wa not President
Reagan’s intention in first proposing ~ reform in 1985 and probably was not Congress’s in passing
the TRA.
The organization of international business appears to be very sensitive to its tax
treatment. In their survey of U.S, taxation of international inwme, Ault and Bradford (1990) point to
the centrality of wntrol distinctions in the classification of inmme, and note the Iirdi.sbetween
wntrol, tax rula, and the notion of “competitiven~s. ” The changed U.S. tm environment after 1986
made it more difficult for foreign firms, particularly those in low tax countries, to attract and kwp
U.S. partners. In response, succasful joint ventures bwarne more heavily leveraged and made
greater use of royalties to compensate U.S, investors. Thwe reactions sugg~t that traditional
definitions of control - as ownership stakm greater than 51% - may not fully d~cribe the relationship
between joint owners.
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U.S. Joint Venture Intensity, by GDP Growth and R&D Intensity, 1982






















Note: The table presents sample moments of ratios of equity in US .-owned joint ventures to equity in all U.S.-
owned foreign Mliates, Fast GDP growth countries are those countries growing at least 4°Aper annum over
1960- 1985; slow GDP growth countries are those growing more slowly tian 47..High R&D intensity
countries we those countries with R&D/GDP mtios exceeding 0,9°/0 in 1988; low R&D intensity countries are
those with mtios below O,90/..Table 2
U.S. Joint Venture Intensity, 1982
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Total Affiliate Equih in Joint Venture Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.0231 -0.0140 0.2953 0,0068 -0.0427










3.8272 3.9988 -2.7171 -01649 -0.9753
(2.1023) (2.1090) (2.9588) (3.0127) (2.2285)
0.0341 0.0238 -0.2184 -0,1764 -0.1163
(0.0346) (0,0409) (0.0666) (0,0669) (0.0573)
5.6695 4,7523 4.1430
(1.5629) (1.6517) (1.3625)
0.0132 0.0076 0.0044 0.0032





Adj. R* 0,0547 0.0991 0.2468 0.2968 0.4401
# Ohs. 40 38 38 34 34
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of equity in U.S.-owned joint ventures to equi~ in all US .*wned
foreign filities. “7. A GDP, 1960-1985” is real GDP growth between 1960and 1985 measured at
international prices, “R&D Lntensity” represents R&D/GDP ratios in 1988. “GDP 1982” is 1982 GDP
measured in $100 billion. ‘T= ‘82” is the ti rate applicable to U.S. investors in 1982 (truncated at 340/0).
“Ownership Restrictions” is the fraction of U.S, firms indicating that host governments limit their percentage
ownership of local affiliates. The columns report estimated OLS coefficients; White-comeeted standard errors
are in parentheses,Table 3
U.S. Joint Venture Activity by Number of Affiliates and Parents, 1982-1989
Numbers of Affiliates and Parents
% Change
Nonb~ affiliates of all parents 1982 1989 (1982-89)
Minori~-owned aflilities 2,868 2,516 -12,27
Majority-owned filiates 14,589 15,654 7.30
Total affiliates 17,457 18,170 4.08
YO Change
All parents of nonbti affiliates 1982 1989 (1982-89)
Parents with minority-owned affiliates 778 689 -11.44
Parents with majority-wned fiiates 1,931 2,065 6,94
Total parents 2,138 2,209 3.32
Note: The top panel reports numbers of minori~awned and majority-wned foreign tiliates of U.S, firms in
1982 and 1989. The bottom panel reports numbers of U.S. pwent &s with minority-owned and majority-
owned foreign filiates in 1982 and 1989. Colu entries in the bo~m panel do not sum to total due to
parent firms with both minority-wned and majority+wned affiliates,Table 4
Nonparametric Measures by Ownership Status and Tax Rate, [982-1989
% A Affiliate Equity, A Royal~ Payments. A Leverwe Ratio 1982-1989
Low Tax Countries High Tax Countries
Mean 0,5377 2.2021
Joint Ventures Median 0,2973 0.5816
Std. dev, 1,1909 4.1848
0/0A Equity -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean 1,2922 0.5324
Majority Owned Median 1,1687 0,5352
Std. dev. 0,8424 1,3717
Mean -0,0003 -0.0031
Joint Ventures Median 0,0000 0.0000
Std. dev. 0,0094 0.0099
ARoyalty -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean 0,0035 0.0112
Majority Owned Median 0,0037 0.0052
Std. dev. 0,0082 0.0149
Mean 0,0738 -0.0302
Joint Ventures Median 0,0570 -0,0215
Std. dev. 0.2190 0. [636
A Leverage -------------- ------------------------------ ------------- ------------------------------------------- -
Mean -0,0223 -0,0106
Majority Owned Median -0.0346 -0,0057
Std. dev. 0,1082 0.1411
Note: The table presents moments of percentage changes in equity, changes in royalty payments, and changes
in leverage ratios for joint ventures and majority-owned affiliates in low tax and high hx countries behveen
1982 and 1989. kw tax countries are those countries that have tax rates lower than 33% in 1982; high tax
countries are those with tax rates greater than 33°/0. There are 21 observations for joint ventures in low tax
countries, and 23 in high tax countries. There are 22 observations for majority owned ventures in low tax










































?“ o“Appendix Table 1
Variable Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation No. Ohs.
Fraction of To~ Affili@
Equi& in Joint Venture Form. 1982
% A GDP, 1960-1985
R&D htensity






% AAffiliate Equity, 1982-1989
Joint Ventures
Majority Owned





Joint Venture - Majority Owned
A Leverage Ratio, 1982-1989
Joint Ventures
Majority Owned




















































Note: “~. A GDP, 1960-1985” is real GDP groti between 1960 and 1985measured at international prices. “R&D
Intensity” represents R&D/GDP ratios in 1988. “GDP 1982” is 1982 GDP memured in $100 billion. “’Tax ’82” is the
1982 tax rate applicable to U.S. investors (truncated at 34~o); “Tax ’89” is the corresponding 1989 tax rate, “Own-
Restrictions” is the fraction of U.S. fm indicating that host governments limit thek percentage ownership of local
affdiates, Mlliate equity, royalty, and leverage variables are counhy-level aggregates reported in the 1982 and 1989
BEA Benchmark Surveys. c’%A ~lliate Equity, 1982-1989” is the growth rate of equity in U.S.-owned joint ventures,
majori~-owned U,S. tilliates, and the difference between these rates, between 1982 and 1989. “A Royalty Payments,1982-1989” is the change between 1982 and 1989 in royalty payments (normalized by affili:lte eq(lity ) from U S.-owned
joint ventures. majori~-owned U.S. tilliates, and the difference between these changes. “’J Lc~er:)ge Ratio. 1982-1989”
is tie change behveen 1982 and 1989 in the debt/assets ratio of U.S.-owned joint ventures. n)ajority-otvrred U.S.
affdiates, and tie difference between these changes.Appendix Table 2
Tax Rates



































































Source: Authors’ calctiations based on d~ in Price Waterhouse (1989) and BEA (1992).N 0“
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